What was at stake
DKIM is the signature that proves a message really comes from the sending domain and was not changed on the way. Gmail and Yahoo require it from bulk senders, and Outlook.com now requires SPF, DKIM and DMARC from domains sending more than 5,000 emails a day. When the signature fails, the mail is treated as less trustworthy.
A failing signature is easy to miss. The sending server still reports the message as delivered, and the DNS record looks right in every checker. The failure only shows in the authentication results of the copy that arrives.
The challenge
Our team runs its own sending servers. Mail is created by our sending software, handed to the mail server, signed with DKIM and delivered. The DNS records were correct, but the copies arriving at Microsoft showed the DKIM check as failed.
There was no single fault. Each time one cause was fixed and received copies were checked again, the next one appeared. Replacing the key or the DNS record would not have helped, because the record was never the problem.
What Sky did
- 01Start from the received copy. We read the authentication results and full headers of messages that actually arrived at Microsoft, rather than relying on DNS checkers or the server’s own logs.
- 02Compare what was signed with what was sent. A DKIM signature covers a chosen list of headers. We compared that list with the headers really present in each message when it was signed and when it left the server.
- 03Cause 1: a route that skipped signing. Messages handed to the server through its HTTP interface bypassed the signing step completely. We added signing to that route and confirmed a passing DKIM result on a received copy.
- 04Cause 2: headers signed before they existed. The signature covered headers such as Date and Message-ID even when a message did not have them yet. When they were added later, the signature no longer matched. Date is now created before signing, and Message-ID was taken off the list of signed headers.
- 05Cause 3: a change after signing. A step that reordered headers ran after the signature and altered the message. We removed it, so nothing touches a message once it is signed.
- 06Cause 4: headers lost on the way in. The HTTP interface removed the To and Date headers and rewrote the character set. We moved message hand-off to SMTP, which passes these headers through unchanged.
- 07Verify every mail stream. We sent production, warm-up and test mail through the fixed setup. Microsoft accepted all three, with SPF, DKIM and the server’s HELO name aligned to the sending domain.
- 08Make it permanent. The fixes went into the shared server templates, so new and redeployed servers get them automatically, guarded by 35 automated policy checks.
What the received copy showed
Simplified from our engineering records. The real sending domain is replaced with example.com.
Before Authentication-Results: dkim=fail (header.d=example.com)Cause Signed header list included Date; Date was added after signingFix Date created before signing; Message-ID no longer signedFix No reordering after signing; hand-off moved to SMTPAfter Production, warm-up and test mail: 250 accepted by MicrosoftCheck SPF aligned · DKIM 2048-bit, d=example.com · HELO matches domainThe results
- Every route signs mail
Messages entering the mail server by SMTP or by its HTTP interface are now signed with DKIM.
- Signatures stay intact
Headers the signature covers exist before signing, and nothing changes the message afterwards.
- Accepted by Microsoft
After the final fix, production, warm-up and test mail were all accepted by Microsoft, with SPF, DKIM and the HELO name aligned.
- Fixed once for every server
The fixes live in the shared templates, so each new or redeployed server starts with them instead of repeating the problem.
What this means for you
If your DNS checker shows a valid DKIM record but mail still underperforms, the answer is usually in the received copy. This is where a Sky deliverability audit starts: we read authentication results on real messages at each provider, then trace any failure back to the step that caused it.
- Authentication results on received copies at Gmail, Outlook.com and Yahoo
- Which headers your signature covers, and whether they exist when signing happens
- Anything that changes a message after signing, such as added footers or rewritten links
- Whether every route into your sending system signs mail, not just the main one
DNS checker says valid, but DKIM still fails?
Book a free 30-minute discovery call and tell us what you are seeing. We’ll ask about your setup, volumes and what changed, then suggest the right next step.
- The call is free. You decide afterwards.
- If you need our help: Deliverability baseline audit, from $1,250 (one-time). Scope agreed first.
- No passwords, API keys or recipient lists needed.
Provider rules and standards
The requirements this work had to meet, from the providers and standards bodies that set them. Rules change, so check the current version before changing a live sending program.
- [1]RFC 6376: DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures How DKIM signs a chosen list of headers, including headers that do not exist yet, and why later changes break verification.
- [2]Outlook’s new requirements for high-volume senders — Microsoft Tech Community Outlook.com’s SPF, DKIM and DMARC requirements for domains sending more than 5,000 emails a day.
- [3]Email sender guidelines — Google Workspace Admin Help Gmail’s authentication requirements for senders, including bulk senders.
- [4]Sender Requirements & Recommendations — Yahoo Sender Hub Yahoo’s authentication requirements for bulk senders.
